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Abstract  
 
This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential 
negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across 
negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to 
explain why sentences and their negations are inconsistent, and inconsistent in virtue 
of the meaning of negation (the Semantic Condition). Third, the ability of the account 
to generalize regardless of the topic of the negated sentence (the Generality 
Condition). The paper discusses three accounts of negation available to moral 
expressivists. The first – the „dominant commitment account‟ – fails to meet the 
Fregean Condition. The two remaining accounts – one suggested by commitment 
semantics and the other by recent analyses of the „expression‟ relation – satisfy all 
three conditions. Mark Schroeder‟s argument that the dominant commitment account 
is the only option available to expressivists is considered and rejected.  
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Can expressivists give an account of the meaning of sentential negation? The initial 
problem is that the most natural way to understand negation is in terms of truth-
conditions: If the meaning of an indicative sentence is given by the conditions under 
which it is true, then the meaning of its negation can be discerned by understanding 
that a negated sentence is true just in case the unnegated sentence is false. For 
expressivists the underlying semantics for moral sentences is not truth-conditional; 
they must therefore depart from the natural understanding of negation, at least in 
moral contexts. The problem is not so much the unnaturalness of this departure (for 
the fact that a second-order theory, even a semantic theory, comes naturally to us 
should bear little argumentative weight) but the very possibility of an expressivist 
position that captures all the semantic properties of negation.     
In this paper I discuss three ways for expressivists to address their problem 
with sentential negation (hereafter just „negation‟). The first of these accounts is 
suggested by Schroeder (2008a, 2008b), who argues not only that this account solves 
the problem, but that it is the only way for expressivists to do so. I argue that 
Schroeder is wrong on both counts. I offer two alternative expressivist accounts of 
negation, both of which avoid a fatal flaw apparent in Schroeder‟s account, and are 
otherwise plausible.
1
 In the penultimate section, I diagnose how Schroeder was led 
astray. The conclusion is that the negation problem fails to threaten the viability of the 
expressivism, although expressivists are well-advised to take a different path to the 
one Schroeder suggests.   
 
1. Expressivism and Embedding 
 
 Expressivists‟ problem with negation is an instance of the more general 
problem of sentential embedding.  Expressivism starts as an account of the meaning 
of simple moral sentences, that is, sentences of the form „x is M‟ where M is a moral 
predicate and x is a subject non-morally described. According to expressivists these 
sentences express non-cognitive attitudes directed at x (and perhaps also at attitudes 
towards x). The attitude expressed, and the co-operative action-guiding nature of this 
expression, gives the meaning of the sentence. Expressivists typically give a 
structurally identical semantic story for simple non-moral sentences, only these are 
taken to express beliefs rather than attitudes.
2
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 The embedding problem arises because natural language is more complex than 
this basic theory allows. All simple sentences can be embedded in contexts where 
they form just part of a larger sentence. For example, „x is M‟ can occur as a sub 
clause in the sentences: „It is not the case that x is M‟, „It is false that x is M‟, „John 
believes that x is M‟ and „x is M because y is N‟. The embedding problem is the 
problem of providing an account of the sentences formed by such embedding contexts 
– call them complex sentences – and hence an account of the meaning of sentences as 
they appear as sub clauses in such contexts.
3
 The most discussed type of embedding 
problem concerns indirect contexts where the embedded sentence is no longer 
asserted. The negation problem falls into this subclass.   
What are the conditions on a solution to the negation problem? The following 
three conditions can be abstracted from the recent literature.
4
  
First, an account of negation must explain how the meaning of sentences, both 
simple and complex, remains constant across negated and unnegated contexts.  „x is 
M‟ means the same when it occurs in the sentence „x is M‟ as when it occurs inside 
the sentential negation operator in „¬(x is M)‟. A simple proof of this is that the two 
sentences are inconsistent. I shall call this the Fregean Condition, following Geach 
(1965). It follows from the Fregean Condition that the meaning of a negated sentence 
is some function of the meaning of the sentence it negates.  
Second, an account of negation must explain why systematic semantic 
relations hold between sentences and their negations, and hold in virtue of the 
meaning of the negation. Here the relevant semantic relation is the one appealed to 
above: the inconsistency of „x is M‟ with „¬(x is M)‟. It is in virtue of the meaning of 
the operator „¬‟ that these sentences are inconsistent.5 Hence an account of negation 
must explain this inconsistency, and explain it by reference to the semantic 
contribution of negation. Call this the Semantic Condition.  
Third, an account of negation must be generalizable regardless of the topic of 
the sentence embedded. The sentence „x is Ф‟ can be sensibly negated regardless of 
whether „Ф‟ is a moral or non-moral predicate. Further, complex sentences such as 
conditionals, disjunctions and propositional attitude ascriptions can also be negated. 
Across all these contexts, the distinctive semantic contribution of negation remains 
constant (at least, common understanding sees no difference between the functioning 
of negation in these contexts). An account of negation needs to preserve this 
univocality. Call this the Generality Condition.  
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Satisfying each of these conditions is arguably necessary for a successful 
account of negation. The argument is that any account that didn‟t satisfy one of these 
conditions would be committed to denying obvious semantic facts, such as the fact 
that sentences preserve their meaning when embedded, the fact that sentences and 
their negations are inconsistent or the fact that negation is univocal. I will not argue 
that joint satisfaction of these conditions is sufficient for a successful account of 
negation. For all that is said here, it remains a possibility that there are further 
conditions on such an account. But no claim of sufficiency is necessary for my 
argument. Of the three accounts of negation offered I argue that the first fails to meet 
the Fregean Condition and therefore should be rejected. The second and third meet all 
three conditions. 
 
1. The Unwin/Hale Problem 
 
Before coming to these accounts, it is worthwhile to discuss an argument developed 
separately by Unwin (1999) and Hale (2002). Though this argument can be presented 
as an argument against the very possibility of an expressivist account of negation, it is 
better understood as providing an indication of the sort of mistakes that expressivists 
needs to avoid.  
 Consider an agent who accepts that x is M. We might consider three 
contrasting characters. First, an agent who accepts that not-x is M. Second, an agent 
who accepts that: it is not the case that x is M. Third, an agent who simply has no 
opinion as to whether x is M or not-M. We can represent these positions thus: 
 
(1) „x is M‟ 
(2) „¬x is M‟ 
(3) „¬(x is M)‟ 
(4) „Harrumph‟ 
 
There are a couple of points worth noting here.  
First, in (2), „¬‟ functions in a perfectly understandable way as a subject-
operator rather than a sentential-operator. This is sometimes called internal negation 
to contrast it with the external negation evident in (3) and which is our primary 
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concern. Internal negation is easily understood when the subject is a gerund such as 
„murder‟, where „¬x‟ is „not murdering‟. It can also, somewhat less naturally, be 
understood where x is an object like „the girl‟: here „¬x‟ would roughly translate as 
„everything but the girl‟. In what follows, I accept the common assumption that „¬x‟ 
makes sense given either type of substitution for x.   
Second, the position expressed in (4) is the position of someone who has no 
opinion as to the M-ness of x, although she may have opinions about other issues. 
(Perhaps this is better represented as „HarrumphM-ness of x‟, but I avoid this unnecessary 
complexity). This position covers two distinct possibilities, which we may stipulate as 
Indifference and Agnosticism. The Indifferent agent simply has no opinion regarding 
the M-ness of x, either because she hasn‟t yet considered the matter or because she is 
yet to confront what she considers sufficient reason for assent or dissent. By contrast, 
the Agnostic agent holds that there can in fact be no sufficient reason for assent or 
dissent (or, more strongly, that there could not possibly be such a reason). Both the 
Indifferent agent and the Agnostic avoid the issue of the M-ness of x, but they do so 
in different ways: the Agnostic has ruled herself out ever assenting (or dissenting) to 
the claim that x is M in a way that the Indifferent agent has not. (The Agnostic is a 
particular concern of Hale (2002)).  
The Unwin/Hale problem is as follows. According to expressivists (1) 
expresses an attitude directed at x (and perhaps also at attitudes directed at x). For our 
purposes it doesn‟t matter whether this attitude is positive or negative, so it can be 
formalized as „α!x‟. The problem is giving an expressivist account of (3). Following 
the expressivists‟ central claim, we might imagine that the meaning of (3) is given by 
the attitude it expresses. Further, since we are seeking an account of negation, we 
might imagine that the best way to give an account of this attitude is to insert a 
negation into the description of the attitude expressed by (1), namely „α!x‟. The 
problem is that it seems there are only two places this negation can go and both result 
in the conflation of (3) with one of the other of the positions contrasted with (1).  
First, suppose the negation appears inside the attitude-operator, so that (3) 
expresses the attitude „α!¬x‟. The problem is that this view it conflates (3) with (2), 
since if (1) expresses α!x then simple substitution guarantees that (2) expresses α!¬x.  
Second, suppose the negation appears outside the attitude-operator, so that (3) 
expresses the attitude „¬α!x‟. Now it is initially unclear what the symbol „¬‟ might 
signify when it occurs in front of an attitude-operator, but two possibilities suggest 
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themselves. First, perhaps „¬α!x‟ is simply an absence of the attitude „α!x‟. But this 
cannot be what is expressed in (3), for it conflates the position expressed there with 
Indifference. Second, perhaps „¬α!x‟ indicates an ongoing commitment not to have 
the attitude „α!x‟. But this also cannot be what is expressed by (3), since it conflates 
the position expressed there with Agnosticism. If these are the only possible 
interpretations of „¬‟ is it occurs outside an attitude-operator, this version of 
expressivism is committed to conflating the position expressed by (3) with one or 
other of the positions expressed by (4). Either way, therefore, expressivism conflates 
positions that should not be conflated.  
This problem is not fatal to expressivism.
6
 The proper conclusion is only that 
if the meaning of (3) is given by the attitude it expresses, this attitude cannot be the 
same as any of the attitudes expressed by (2) or (4). It is true that an account of this 
attitude cannot be easily generated by application of the negation symbol in the ways 
Unwin and Hale consider. But it doesn‟t follow that no such account can be given. 
Two such accounts are given below, in §§2-3. A third option is to deny the antecedent 
of the troublesome conditional, and this is discussed in §4.  
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2. The Dominant Commitment Account 
 
 The Unwin/Hale problem is that in moving from the attitude expressed from 
an unnegated sentence to the attitude expressed by the negated sentence, there are 
simply not enough places for negation. The obvious solution is to discern some 
complexity in the attitude expressed by the unnegated sentence that generates a 
further place for negation.
7
 What sort of complexity might this be? One suggestion is 
to borrow from expressivist accounts of the distinctive nature of the moral attitude. 
On a well-known view (which has been parenthetically trailed) moral attitudes are 
distinctive insofar as they are ascended, that is, directed not only at objects but at 
attitudes towards those objects.
8
 Suppose we focus on the latter and say that „x is M‟ 
expresses an attitude directed at attitudes towards x. We can formalize this as „α!β!x‟. 
The extra attitude-operator generates an extra place for negation, opening up the 
possibility of a satisfactory account of the negation-attitude. Schematically, we can 
distinguish the attitudes expressed in our four positions thus: 
 
(1‟) „x is M‟   expresses  α!β!x 
(2‟) „¬x is M‟   expresses  α!β!¬x 
(3‟) „¬(x is M)‟ expresses  α!¬β!x 
(4‟) „Harrumph‟  expresses   ¬α!β!x 
 
As an example, take „x is M‟ to be „Murder is wrong‟. Schroeder (2008a, 589) 
suggests that „α!‟ might be the attitude of „being for‟, which is a „very general positive 
attitude‟ and that „β!‟ might be the attitude of „blaming for‟, understood in the usual 
way. Hence „Murder is wrong‟ expresses being for: blaming for murder, whereas „It 
is not the case that murder is wrong‟ expresses being for: not blaming for murdering. 
The latter attitude is distinct from the attitude expressed by „Not murdering is wrong‟, 
which is being for: blaming for not murdering. It is also distinct from the attitude of 
those who are Indifferent or Agnostic about the wrongness of murder: the former is a 
mere absence of any relevant attitude of being for, the latter is a considered 
commitment to the absence of such an attitude. Hence the Unwin/Hale problem is 
solved.  
 This solution generalizes to all simple moral sentences. It doesn‟t rely on these 
particular examples of „α!‟ and „β!‟ – we may suppose that different moral predicates 
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are associated with different attitude pairs. All the view requires is that the attitudes 
expressed by simple moral sentences exhibit enough complexity to warrant three 
negations: two inside to the dominant attitude-operator and one outside. Furthermore, 
this view mirrors a simple account of the semantic role of negation when the 
unembedded sentences are taken to express beliefs rather than attitudes. Since the 
objects of beliefs are structured propositions rather than objects, beliefs have two 
places for negation within the scope of the belief-operator: one that modifies the 
subject of the proposition and one that modifies the whole proposition. Thus the 
Unwin/Hale problem is not a problem for sentences expressive of belief. The 
dominant commitment account shows, in just the same way, why it needn‟t be a 
problem for sentences expressive of attitude (Schroeder, 2008a, 590). 
 Call this suggestion the dominant commitment account, since it supposes that 
both negated and unnegated simple sentences express the same commitment type – 
the dominant commitment – but directed at different objects. Here „commitment‟ is 
intended in the usual sense that includes both beliefs and attitudes and may include 
other types of mental state, such as personal projects, patterns of emotional reaction 
and so on. In the case of simple moral sentences, the dominant commitment type is an 
attitude („α!‟) and its objects are attitudes directed at objects or actions („β!x‟).  
 
a. Semantic Condition 
 
How does the dominant commitment account fare with respect to the three 
conditions on an account of negation?  
Take first the Semantic Condition. Does the account explain the inconsistency 
of „x is M‟ and „¬(x is M)‟ in the right sort of way? According to Schroeder (2008a, 
593) the explanation has two components. The two sentences are inconsistent because 
they express (i) tokens of an inconsistency-transmitting commitment type, namely 
„α!‟, that are (ii) directed at inconsistent contents, namely the contents „β!x‟ and 
„¬β!x‟. Both points require some explication.  
First, a commitment type is inconsistency-transmitting just in case having two 
tokens of that commitment-type directed at inconsistent contents is inconsistent. The 
paradigm example of an inconsistency-transmitting attitude-type is belief: believing 
that x is F and believing ¬(x is F) is inconsistent. Schroeder (2008a, 581) labels this 
type of psychological inconsistency „A-type‟. According to the dominant commitment 
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account, the sentential inconsistency of negated and unnegated sentences is the result 
of the A-type inconsistency of the states of mind they express. By extension from 
Schroeder‟s terminology, we can call this form of explanation the „A-type model‟. 
Second, two contents are inconsistent when they cannot be simultaneously 
realized. This definition applies both to propositions (the contents of beliefs) and 
objects, actions and attitudes such as „blaming for murder‟ (the contents of attitudes). 
In the former case, the propositions „Grass is green‟ and „It is not the case that: grass 
is green‟ cannot be simultaneously realized because they cannot both obtain. In the 
latter case the attitudes „blaming for murder‟ and „not blaming for murder‟ cannot be 
simultaneously realized because the same agent cannot do both. In both cases, the 
contents are inconsistent in so far as they cannot be simultaneously realized.
9
  
 To see how the A-type model works in practice, take an example. Suppose 
that „Murder is wrong‟ expresses being for: blaming for murder and that „It is not the 
case that: murder is wrong‟ expresses being for: not blaming for murder. On the 
dominant commitment account, the sentences are inconsistent because the 
commitments they express are psychologically inconsistent and this in turn is because 
(i) „being for‟ is an inconsistency transmitting commitment-type and (ii) „blaming for 
murder‟ and „not blaming for murder‟ are inconsistent contents.  
Is this a good explanation of the sentential inconsistency? There is one gap. 
The expressivist will need to explain why certain commitment types, such as being 
for, are inconsistency-transmitting. Schroeder sounds a note of optimism for 
expressivists here, arguing that 
 
It is intelligible for expressivists to hope that whatever explains the inconsistency-
transmitting character of belief…will also explain why [moral attitudes] are 
inconsistency-transmitting (Schroeder, 2008a, 577). 
 
Whether this promissory note can be cashed will be considered latter (§3c). For now, 
at least, there is no reason to suppose that the account of psychological inconsistency 
cannot be transferred to the dominant commitment type involved in the moral case.  
 There is, however, a potential objection to the A-type model. The objection is 
the old one that any account of complex logical sentences, such as negations, that 
supposes those sentences‟ logical form to be one where an attitude-operator is 
dominant cannot construe failures of inference involving those sentences as involving 
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logical, as opposed to mere attitudinal, failings.
10
 Since the dominant commitment 
account just is the view that, when simple moral sentences are negated, the proper 
logical form has a dominant attitude operator, it seems to fall foul of this objection: 
having the attitudes „α!β!x‟ and „α!¬β!x‟ is a mere attitudinal failing, not a logical 
one.  
In fact there are two issues here worth distinguishing. First, the inconsistency 
involved in the case of moral sentences and their negations needs to be inconsistency 
guaranteed by logical form. And this result is secured on the dominant commitment 
account: it is in virtue of their form that the attitudes „α!β!x‟ and „α!¬β!x‟ are 
inconsistent. Assuming that „α!‟ is inconsistency-transmitting, they are inconsistent 
under any consistent interpretation of their terms.
11
 
Second the account needs to explain the nature of the error made by agents 
who deny argumentative inferences whose validity depends on the inconsistency of 
moral sentences and their negations. In particular for the dominant commitment 
account, one might worry that having the attitudes „α!β!x‟ and „α!¬β!x‟ is a minor 
offence compared to having beliefs whose truth-conditions cannot simultaneously 
obtain. After all, it is not uncommon to wish for incompatible things, and perhaps 
being for incompatible things is no more heinous.
12
 But again, the defender of the 
dominant commitment account can defer: she can claim that in both cases the mistake 
is having inconsistency-transmitting commitments directed at inconsistent contents. 
Further, in so far as the explanation as to why the α!-commitment is inconsistency-
transmitting mirrors the explanation of why beliefs are inconsistency-transmitting, 
these errors will be equally serious. Of course, this reply relies on the availability of a 
uniform explanation of why beliefs and moral attitudes (such as the α!-commitment) 
are inconsistency-transmitting, but Schroeder‟s point applies here too: in the absence 
of grounds for pessimism about this explanation being available in both cases, it is 
reasonable for expressivists to proceed on the assumption that the explanation can be 
made to work in both sorts of case. (This possibility is explored in §3(c).) This 
proviso aside, I will henceforth assume that the dominant commitment account can 
explain the inconsistency of moral sentences and their negations in a way that 
sufficiently captures the argumentative force of avoiding such inconsistencies.  
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b. Generality Condition 
 
Consider next the Generality Condition. So far the dominant commitment 
account has focused on simple moral sentences, but it easily generalizes to all simple 
sentences. According to this generalized view, „x is Ф‟ expresses either an attitude or 
a belief. In both cases, „¬(x is Ф)‟ expresses a mental state describable using the same 
dominant commitment-operator (attitude or belief) only with a negation inserted 
immediately after that operator. In schematic terms, if the simple sentence „s‟ 
expresses the commitment Cψ then „¬s‟ expresses the commitment C¬ψ.13 Here „C‟ 
stands for a given commitment-type and „ψ‟ stands for the content of that 
commitment. In the case of simple moral sentences, the commitment is an attitude 
(such as „α!‟) whose content is an attitude directed at things (such as „β!x‟). In the 
case of simple non-moral sentences, the commitment is a belief whose content is a 
proposition. The semantic function of negation is univocal across these cases.  
 Unfortunately such an account runs into difficulties when we consider 
complex sentences that embed both moral and non-moral sentences, such as „¬(m or 
n)‟ where „m‟ is a moral sentence and „n‟ is a non-moral sentence. The resulting 
complex sentence is inconsistent with both „m‟ and „n‟. An account of negation must 
explain this. For the dominant commitment account this means specifying the 
commitment expressed by the complex sentence. The problem is that whatever this 
commitment type is, it cannot be the same both as the dominant commitment involved 
in „m‟ (which is an attitude) and as the dominant commitment involved in „n‟ (which 
is a belief). This entails that the dominant commitment account‟s preferred method of 
explaining inconsistency – the A-type model – cannot apply in all cases.14 
 
 Is this a problem for the dominant attitude account? It need not be. There are 
at least two possible ways for the dominant attitude account to be developed so as to 
avoid this problem, both of which satisfy the Generality Condition.  
 
 The first approach is to abandon the A-type model for explaining 
inconsistency, at least in some cases. This is by no means a fatal admission. As we 
saw above, even the A-type model is incomplete as an explanation of sentential 
inconsistency until it can be explained why certain commitment types are 
inconsistency-transmitting. The possibility remains that the explanation of the 
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inconsistency of token commitments of the same type directed at inconsistent contents 
generalizes to a form that includes explanations of the inconsistency of token 
commitments of different types (even, perhaps, token commitments with consistent 
contents).  At least, until the explanatory gap in A-type model is plugged, this 
possibility cannot be ruled out. On such view, the A-type model of explaining 
inconsistency is not redundant, but is a particular manifestation of a more general 
explanatory form. (Again, I believe that this possibility is realized, as I explain in 
§5(c).) For the time being therefore, note that abandoning the universality of the A-
type model of inconsistency is not necessarily fatal, given that that model is itself 
incomplete.  
  
The second response is more radical, yet preserves the A-type model in all 
cases. On this view, all assertoric sentences, moral and non-moral, simple and 
complex, express tokens of the same dominant commitment type and this 
commitment type is inconsistency-transmitting. This may be called the single 
dominant commitment account. 
As Schroeder points out (2008a, 597), the single dominant commitment 
account is radical, but not without its attractions. It preserves the A-type model of 
explaining inconsistency in all cases, and this model has a good precedent in the case 
of belief. Obviously, it owes us an account of what the single dominant commitment 
type is. Expressivists are well-advised not to take this to be belief, since then their 
distinctive account of the meaning of moral sentences is lost. A more promising 
alternative is that the commitment is an attitude, perhaps the attitude of „being for‟. 
One startling consequence of this way of developing the view is that beliefs (the states 
expressed by some non-moral sentences) turn out to be a particular kind of non-
cognitive attitude. Schroeder suggests that believing that x is F might be construed as 
being for: proceeding as if x is F (2008b, 93-5). Though such a move undermines 
many of the stated motivations for expressivism – which typically rely on a sharp 
distinction between belief and attitude – at least it provides a unified semantics of 
negation. Expressivists may hope that shifting the motivation for the theory is small 
price to pay for a semantics that works.  
 Still, the single dominant commitment view is a bold step for expressivists to 
take and many would think that if this only way for expressivists to solve the negation 
problem, then expressivism is in trouble. Schroeder has sympathies with this line of 
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thought: one way of understanding his geeky elucidation of the single dominant 
commitment view is as a reductio of expressivism.
15
 My own view is that 
expressivists are best not to adopt single dominant commitment account: they should 
beware geeks bearing gifts. But, however that view develops it does at least preserve 
the univocality of negation (and the generality of A-type explanations). In other 
words, if the single dominant commitment account fails, it is not because it fails to 
meet the Generality Condition.  
 
c. Fregean Condition 
 
 Consider finally the Fregean Condition. An account of negation must explain 
the fact that the meaning of sentences, both simple and complex, remains constant 
across negated and unnegated contexts. A well-known argument purports to show that 
no version of expressivism – including the dominant commitment account – can meet 
this condition, at least for any indirect context. The argument is the crux of the so-
called Frege-Geach problem for expressivism and although the standard example 
concerns conditionals, a structurally isomorphic argument can be given for negation. 
The argument runs as follows.  
 
According to expressivists, the meaning of „x is M‟ is given by the attitude it 
expresses. This attitude is not expressed in the negated sentence „¬(x is M)‟. 
Therefore, the meaning of „x is M‟, as it appears in the negated context, cannot be the 
same as when it appears in the unnegated context. Hence the Fregean condition is not 
met.
16
  
 
 As a decisive refutation of expressivism, the Frege-Geach problem is too 
quick. There is in fact a well-known scheme of solution to the problem, originally 
suggested by Hare (1970). The problem is that adherents to the dominant commitment 
account cannot adopt this approach. I will first outline the Harean position and explain 
why it promises to solve the Frege-Geach problem, before showing why the dominant 
commitment account cannot adopt it. 
 Hare claimed that the attitude expressed by „x is M‟ remains „in the offing‟ in 
the attitude expressed by complex sentences such as „¬(x is M)‟. This explains the 
constancy of meaning across these contexts. Cashing out the metaphor, expressivists 
 14 
can hold that „¬(x is M)‟ expresses a complex mental state that is some psychological 
function of the mental state expressed by „x is M‟, where the particular psychological 
function in play is isomorphically determined by the relevant sentential operator, in 
this case negation. Here „psychological function‟ is construed narrowly so that a 
mental state or commitment is some function of another only if it takes the latter as 
one if its functional parts. Schroeder (2008a, 574) calls this position „compositional 
semantics‟, since the meaning of complex sentences is given by complex 
compositional states whose functional parts are the mental states expressed by simple 
sentences. Compositional semantics seems a promising response to the Frege-Geach 
problem. It will explain the constancy of sentential meaning across simple and 
complex contexts in terms of the very same attitude being „in the offing‟ in both 
contexts. In the present case, it is because the commitment expressed by „¬(x is M)‟ is 
some function of the commitment expressed by „x is M‟ that the meaning of the 
sentence is constant across the contexts. Thus the Fregean Condition is met.  
 Unfortunately, the dominant attitude account cannot avail of this way of 
meeting the Fregean condition, because it isn‟t a version of compositional semantics. 
On the account, the sentence „x is M‟ expresses an attitude of the form „α!β!x‟. 
Conversely, „¬(x is M)‟ expresses an attitude of the form „α!¬β!x‟. The problem is 
that the latter is not, in the relevant sense, a function of the former. Rather both are 
functions of a distinct attitude, „β!x‟. Hence the dominant commitment account cannot 
avail itself of the Harean solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
17
  
 The defender of the account might reply: there is an attitude that remains in 
the offing across negated and unnegated contexts, namely the attitude „β!x‟. This is 
the attitude that is α!-ed in the unnegated contexts and whose absence is α!-ed in the 
negated context. Perhaps the fact that this attitude is „in the offing‟ in both contexts 
can explain the constancy of meaning across them. But though this may explain some 
constancy of meaning, it is the wrong type. The relevant explanandum is how „x is M‟ 
has constant meaning across these contexts, and the meaning of „x is M‟ is not given 
by the attitude „β!x‟, but by the attitude „α!β!x‟. So although the dominant 
commitment account can deliver some constancy of meaning, it cannot deliver the 
constancy of meaning of „x is M‟. Thus the Frege-Geach problem is reinstated and the 
dominant commitment account fails to meet the Fregean Condition.
18
 Expressivists 
must look for alternatives.  
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3. Commitment Semantics 
 
a. Rejection 
 
 What is the mental state expressed by „¬(x is M)‟ where „x is M‟ expresses a 
moral attitude? Let us follow the Harean suggestion that it is a state in which the 
original attitude remains „in the offing‟. The development of this view has recently 
been christened „commitment-semantics‟ (Hale, 2002, 145). As Blackburn puts it 
 
the key idea here is that of a functional structure of commitments that is isomorphic with 
or mirrored by the propositional structure that we use to express them (Blackburn 1998, 
71).
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The dominant commitment account doesn‟t achieve this isomorphism, because the 
propositional structure of „¬(x is M)‟ is of a dominant negation operator, but this was 
not mirrored in the psychology.  
 
 Let‟s follow Hare‟s footsteps more closely. Suppose the syntactic form of „¬ 
(x is M)‟ is mirrored in the attitude it expresses, so that in describing this attitude 
negation does occur outside the attitude operator, as „¬α!x‟. Of course, so understood 
„¬‟ must be given a different interpretation to the one at work in Indifference or 
Agnosticism. What might this be? An obvious answer is rejection.
20
 To reject a moral 
attitude is to be committed to adopting an opposed attitude. Roughly it is to think that 
whatever the correct way to respond to the evaluated object is, it isn‟t like that (where 
„that‟ refers to the rejected response). This thought is itself an attitude of response to 
the evaluated object: it is the attitude of someone who has ruled out responding to the 
evaluated object in the rejected way, but is open to responding to it in any other way.  
This brief account of rejection can be made clearer by considering in more 
detail the type of commitment rejected. Modern expressivists hold that moral attitudes 
are settled practical stances or policies of action: to adopt a moral attitude towards an 
object is to have a policy of response to objects of that type, or to objects with certain 
of its features. As one expressivist puts it, the function of a moral attitude is to 
“mediate the move from features of the situation to a reaction” (Blackburn 1993, 
168). To reject a moral attitude, therefore, is to reject a policy of reaction. It is to 
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adopt the policy that might be characterized as „whatever the correct way to respond 
to the world is, it isn‟t like that‟. We can understand this rejection as a conditional 
policy: it is the policy of adopting some specific policy other than the rejected policy. 
In terms of functions from features to reactions, the attitude rejected can be 
represented by the move from features of a situation to a particular reaction 
(disapproval or censure, say) whilst the attitude of rejection can be represented as the 
move from the same features of the situation to some other reaction.
21
 One final 
illuminating way of representing these policies and their rejections is by considering 
the logical space of possible policies in response to an evaluated object (possible 
functions from objects to reactions). Where the rejected policy can be represented as 
one particular function from the object to a reaction, the policy of rejection can be 
represented as a disjunctive commitment to one of the complementary set of 
functions.  
 
To give meat to these bones, consider an example. To think murder wrong is 
to have a certain policy towards murder: to avoid doing it oneself and to encourage 
others to do likewise, say. This can be represented as a function from murderous acts 
to these reactions. To reject this policy is to be committed to some other reaction to 
murder, that is, to be committed to responding towards murder in some way other 
than avoiding it and encouraging others to do likewise. In terms of function, this can 
be represented as the function from murderous acts to some other reaction. It is this 
policy that gets expression in the judgment that murder is permissible. Note that in 
this sense, judgments of permissibility express conditional policies (a policy of 
adopting one amongst a set of reactions) that agents can adopt without being 
committed to any particular reaction. This reflects the fact that it is possible to hold 
that it is not the case that murder is wrong, for example, without having a definite 
view on whether murder is right, supererogatory, or „merely permissible‟ (that is, 
neither right nor wrong nor supererogatory). On the commitment semantic approach 
these last three judgments express particular policies of response towards murder, 
whereas the judgment that murder is permissible (that is, the judgment that it is not 
the case that murder is wrong) expresses the policy of being committed to one or 
other of these reactions.     
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a. Fregean Condition 
 
 How does this account of negation fare with respect to the three conditions? 
Consider first the Fregean condition. This is met because the attitude expressed by the 
unnegated sentence remains „in the offing‟ in the attitude expressed by the negated 
sentence. This is to say that the attitude expressed by the negated sentence is some 
psychological function of the attitude expressed by the unnegated sentence: the 
function is rejection. When an agent asserts a negated moral sentence they express an 
attitude than can be defined in terms of the attitude that it rejects; the former attitude 
remains in the offing as the object of rejection.  
 
b. Generality Condition 
 
 Does the account generalize from simple moral sentences to non-moral 
sentences and complex sentences? Does it meet the Generality Condition? To do this, 
the account of rejection needs to generalizable: just as one can reject the commitments 
expressed by moral sentences, one must be able to reject the commitments expressed 
by simple non-moral sentences (such as „x is F‟) and by complex sentences (such as 
conditionals). I take these cases in turn.  
 Expressivists take most simple non-moral sentences to express beliefs.
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 To 
have a belief is to represent the world as being a certain way. For example, to believe 
that grass is green represents the world as being such that grass is green. To reject a 
belief is to reject a representation of the world: it is to think that whatever the world is 
like, it isn‟t like that. This rejection is itself a belief (just as rejecting a policy is itself 
a policy): it is the belief that the world is some way other than the rejected belief 
represents it as being.  
What of the commitments expressed by complex sentences, such as 
conditionals? Given the general form of commitment semantics, the commitments 
expressed by complex sentences will have functional structure isomorphic with the 
sentences that express them. For example the commitment expressed by „if p then q‟ 
can be functionally described thus: it is the commitment to have the commitment 
expressed by „q‟ should one have the commitment expressed by „p‟. Blackburn 
(1998a, 71) calls this state one of being „tied to a tree‟ of commitments. To reject such 
a complex commitment is to rule out being so tied. It is commitment to one of the set 
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of complex commitments incompatible (mutually unrealizable) with being tied in this 
way. Again, this can be represented in terms of a logical space, this time the space 
represents various ways of linking the two more basic commitments. The rejection 
can be represented in terms of the complement of the commitment rejected.  
Note that this account of the state of rejection is constructive in the sense that 
for any commitment expressed by a sentence, be it a belief, attitude (policy), or tree-
tying commitment, we have a recipe for generating an informative account of the 
commitment expressed by the negation. Moral sentences express attitudes 
characterizable as functions from features to reactions and their negations express 
attitudes characterizable in terms of complementary set of functions („that‟s not the 
way to respond to murder‟). Most non-moral sentences express beliefs characterizable 
by their representational content and their negations express beliefs characterizable in 
terms of the complementary content („the world is not like that‟). Complex sentences 
express tree-tying commitments characterizable as functions between more basic 
commitments and their negations express commitments characterizable in terms of the 
complementary set of functions. Thus commitment semantics does not, as Schroeder 
accuses some extant expressivist accounts, simply describe the sort of thing the 
negation-commitment would need to be if the negation problem is to be solved.
23
 It 
provides an informative psycho-functional account of such commitments that easily 
generalizes.   
 
c. Semantic condition 
 
What, finally, of the Semantic Condition? An account of rejection that 
generalizes is worth nothing if we cannot explain why commitments and their 
rejections are inconsistent. So what is inconsistent about having a commitment and 
yet rejecting it? 
A-type inconsistency is the appropriate model here, at least in some cases. For 
example, to reject the belief that grass is green is just to believe that grass is not green, 
and these beliefs are inconsistent, because grass cannot both be green and not green. 
Likewise, to reject a policy of response to murder is just to adopt the conditional 
policy of having some other response to murder, and these policies are inconsistent 
because they cannot both be enacted. An agent cannot both decide that disapproval, 
say, is the appropriate way to respond to murder, and also decide that some response 
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other than disapproval is the appropriate way to respond to murder. Similarly, a tree-
tying commitment and its rejection are inconsistent because they commit agents to 
ways of being tied (or untied) that cannot simultaneously obtain. In each of these 
three cases the psychological inconsistency of the mental states is the immediate 
explanans of the sentential inconsistency of the sentences used to express them.  
This explanation of inconsistency must face the challenge left outstanding for 
the dominant commitment account: explaining why these commitment types are 
inconsistency-transmitting in a way that secures logical, as opposed to mere 
attitudinal, inconsistency.  
Once again, two issues can be distinguished. First, the inconsistency on show 
in the case of negation must be guaranteed by logical form. And this condition is met. 
It is in virtue of their psychological form that commitments and rejections are 
inconsistent. For example, if „x is M‟ expresses some policy of response towards x 
then „¬(x is M)‟ express the rejection of this policy, that is, the policy of having some 
other response to x. These policies are inconsistent in virtue of their form (they are 
inconsistent under any consistent substitution for „x‟ and „M‟). The same applies in 
the cases of rejecting beliefs and tree-tying commitments.   
 Second, the mistake involved in having inconsistent moral attitudes, or 
inconsistent tree-tying commitments, needs to be sufficiently serious to underwrite the 
logical force of inferences based on these inconsistencies. In particular, having 
inconsistent moral attitudes, or tree-tying commitments, needs to be as serious as 
having inconsistent beliefs. To meet this second challenge, it is helpful to look at the 
case of beliefs and then generalize. There is clearly something wrong with believing 
that mutually unrealizable states of affairs obtain. But what? One answer is to refer to 
the distinctive function of belief. Beliefs, it is often said, aim at truth, at accurate 
representation of the world. This is what explains why believing that x is F is distinct 
from wondering whether x is F: the former represents our understanding of the lay of 
the land and will affect out actions accordingly.
24
 It is also explains why believing 
mutually unrealizable states of affairs to obtain is mistaken: for the land can only lay 
one way, so having both beliefs frustrates the aim of belief. Reference to the function 
of beliefs explains why belief is an inconsistency-transmitting commitment type.  
 Consider next the case of attitudes. Take the attitude of „being for‟. This 
attitude, like desire, aims at the realization of its object. To be for mutually 
incompatible goals is to be set for failure in this regard. This is why „being for‟ is 
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inconsistency-transmitting: being for inconsistent contents frustrates the aim of this 
particular commitment type. This fills the gap in the dominant commitment account‟s 
explanation of inconsistency. It also explains the failure involved in such 
inconsistency in a way that mirrors the account given in the case of beliefs, by 
reference to the function of the commitment in question.  
What about moral attitudes? The function of these attitudes is to regulate the 
move from features of the world to reactions to it, thus guiding action and laying a 
ground for intersubjective coordination. Moral discourse plays an integral role in this 
co-ordinating exercise: moral assertions are not mere sounding off, they are 
persuasive attempts to influence the attitudes and hence actions of others. The policies 
expressed in moral discourse are thereby pushed into a public arena, put forward to be 
discussed, disputed, tested, refined and ultimately publically adopted. According to 
expressivists, therefore, in asserting „x is M‟ one is recommending a particular policy 
of response towards x. To also recommend a conflicting policy of response frustrates 
the coordinating purpose for which moral attitudes are formed and is inconsistent in 
just this sense. To take the simplest example, to assert that „x is wrong‟ is to 
publically recommend a policy of response towards x that involves, at a minimum, 
not x-ing. To assert „It is not the case that x is wrong‟ is to recommend a conditional 
policy of response towards x that is consistent with x-ing. To assert both is therefore 
to recommend conflicting courses of action, thereby frustrating the very purposes for 
which moral attitudes are formed and discussed. It is in this sense that an agent 
making these assertions is inconsistent.
25
 As in the case of belief, it is by reference to 
the function of the commitment type in question that we can understand the force of 
the error involved in having inconsistent tokens of that type. The function changes, 
but the form of explanation is constant. 
Finally, consider tree-tying commitments of the sort expressed by 
conditionals. The function of such commitments is to rule in and rule out certain 
combinations of the more basic commitments.
26
 To be tied up in incompatible ways 
frustrates this function, since it leaves the agent with no stable inferential position 
with respect to the more basic commitments. Again, the explanation is structurally 
identical with that given in the case of beliefs.  
In all these cases, the failure of an agent with inconsistent commitments is to 
frustrate the function of the commitments in question. More precisely, where there is 
inconsistency guaranteed by logical form, as in negation, the set of commitments the 
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agents possesses are such as to guarantee the frustration of the functions of the 
commitments of that set.
27
 This account sees no distinction between the sort of 
mistake involved in having inconsistent beliefs and that involved in having 
inconsistent moral attitudes. There is therefore nothing „mere‟ about attitudinal 
inconsistency. 
Inconsistency, then, involves frustrating the function of the set of 
commitments in question, and logical inconsistency occurs when this frustration is 
guaranteed by the form of the commitments. It seems reasonable to assume that any 
agent who partakes in the practice of forming beliefs, or moral attitudes, or tree-tying 
commitments, at least implicitly endorses forming states with their respective 
functions. It follows that to bundle a set of commitments that guarantees the 
frustration of these functions is to render oneself unintelligible. We do not know what 
to make of an agent who believes both that x is F and that it is not the case that x is F, 
since she adopts a set of commitments that is guaranteed to frustrate the goal of 
having such states at all. In general, therefore, logical inconsistency as understood 
here entails just this sort of unintelligibility.
28
  
One pleasing consequence of this view of logical inconsistency is that it 
generalizes from cases involving one commitment type to cases involving two or 
more commitment types. That is, it moves beyond A-type inconsistency while 
including it as a special case. (This was the result required if one was to resist the 
move to the single dominant commitment account in §2(b).) For example, the set of 
commitments expressed by the sentences „p‟, „if p then q‟ and „¬q‟ may be a belief, a 
tree-tying commitment and a rejection of a policy. Yet in so far as an agent who has 
this set of commitments necessarily frustrates the function of the tree-tying 
commitment (which is to rule in and out more basic commitments) she is inconsistent. 
In so far as this frustration is guaranteed by the form of his commitments, she renders 
herself logically inconsistent.  
In summary, the commitment semantic account of negation can explain the 
sentential inconsistency of sentences with their negations in terms of the 
psychological inconsistency of commitments and their rejections. Such a view doesn‟t 
necessitate viewing attitudinal inconsistency as in any way less serious than 
inconsistency in belief. Ultimately, all types of psychological inconsistency can be 
understood by reference to the frustration of the function of the respective 
commitments, and in some cases (such as negation) this frustration will be guaranteed 
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by the form of the commitments, rendering the agent unintelligible. Hence the 
Semantic Condition is met. 
 
d. Objections 
 
The commitment semantic account of negation can meet the Fregean, 
Semantic and Generality conditions. It is therefore worthy of serious consideration as 
an expressivist account of negation. In order to elaborate the view further, and ward 
off potential objects, some further remarks are necessary.  
 
First, it is worth noting that rejection is not, in the normal sense, a second-
order commitment. It is not a commitment whose object is another commitment (so it 
is not best formalized as „R!α!x‟ for example). To reject a commitment is to take a 
stand on the very same issue as was the topic of the original commitment, but a 
diametrically opposed one. So for example, to reject a policy of action towards 
murder is to adopt a policy towards murder (the policy of responding to murder in 
some other way than the rejected policy). Similarly, to reject a belief about the color 
of grass is to take a stand on the color of grass. Rejection is an opposed commitment, 
defined in terms of the commitment it opposes but occupying an area of the same 
logical space. This point nullifies a possible revival of the Unwin/Hale problem: for if 
rejection just is a negative second-order commitment then it would seem 
indistinguishable from Agnosticism, since the Agnostic too disapproves of the first-
order commitment. The undesirable inference is blocked if rejection is understood as 
a position opposed to the rejected position, not simply directed at it. Both the agent 
who rejects a commitment and an Agnostic rules themselves out adopting the rejected 
commitment. But the Agnostic also rules himself out adopting any commitment in the 
relevant area, whereas the rejecter has a disjunctive commitment to adopting some 
commitment in that area (other than the commitment rejected, obviously). In the 
examples already given, the moral rejecter has a conditional policy of response to 
murder; the non-moral rejecter has a belief about the color of grass. The Agnostic has 
neither. Thus rejection and Agnosticism are distinct. (The possible conflation of 
rejection with Indifference is more easily dealt with, since the Indifferent agent does 
not, whereas the rejecting agent does, rule themselves out adopting the rejected 
commitment). In addition, rejection (and not Agnosticism or Indifference) will 
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typically be accompanied by discursive dispositions to oppose the rejected 
commitment. If you believe that grass is green and I believe that it is not green I will, 
other things being equal, try to persuade you of the falsity of your belief, oppose your 
expression of it, and otherwise dispute with you in open discussion. But discussion is 
not always open. Where the interlocutor is threatening, or otherwise holds power, one 
is sometimes best to forgo trying to change their mind. In such cases the opposed 
commitment – the rejection – remains, though it doesn‟t manifest itself in the normal 
discursive ways.
29
 Rather it persists as a view of the way the world is (in the case of 
belief) or of how to respond to the world (in the case of moral attitudes) or of how to 
combine more basic commitments (in the case of tree-tying commitments).  
 
Second, the account of rejection offered here builds upon brief remarks about 
negation made by Blackburn. He notes one difference between rejection and 
agnosticism (which here includes both Indifference and Agnosticism), namely their 
  
relative „robustness‟: it can take more to shift a definite attitude one way or another than 
it takes to shift agnosticism (Blackburn 2002, 168).  
 
This feature of rejection is explained on the above account, for the rejecter of a belief 
accepts that the world is some way other than the rejected belief represents it as being; 
the rejecter of a policy holds that the way to respond to murder is some way other 
than the rejected policy suggests; and the rejecter of a tree-tying commitment holds 
that the way to be tied to combinations of basic commitments is some way other than 
that encapsulated in the rejected commitment. In the normal case the rejecter will 
have reasons for thinking that the world is this way, or that this policy is appropriate, 
or that this way of being tied (or untied) is justified; reasons which the Indifferent and 
Agnostic agents lack. To change the position of the rejecter requires overcoming or 
undermining these reasons, whereas changing the position of the Indifferent or 
Agnostic agent does not, hence the difference in relative robustness.  
 
 Finally, rejecting a commitment iterates in the same way as negation. „x is Φ‟ 
is logically equivalent to „¬¬(x is Φ)‟. If rejection is the psychological correlate of 
negation, this result must be mirrored in the psychology.
30
 And it is. To reject a 
commitment is to take up the opposed position. To reject this rejection is therefore to 
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take up a position opposed to the opposition, which just is the original commitment. 
This is mostly easily seen in the case of belief. To reject a belief is to have a belief: it 
is to believe that the world is not like the original belief represents it as being. To 
reject this rejection is therefore to believe that it is not the case that the world is not 
like the original belief represents it as being, which is just to believe the world is as 
the original belief represents it as being. The case of policies (such as moral attitudes) 
is similar. To reject a policy is to have the policy of responding to the world in some 
way other than that given by the original policy. To reject this rejection is therefore to 
have the policy of responding to the world in some way other than this policy, which 
is to have the policy of responding to the world in the original way. Thus to reject the 
rejection of a policy is just to have the original policy.
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4. The Expression Account 
 
 Commitment semantics is the most popular way for expressivists to tackle 
indirect contexts, so it is reasonable to attempt to apply it to the case of negation. But 
are there any alternatives? Consider the „expression account‟.  
Return to the Hale/Unwin problem. Take the schema 
 
(1‟) „x is M‟   expresses  ¬α!x 
 
And then, moving to the negated case, the schema 
 
(3‟‟) „¬(x is M)‟  expresses  ???? 
 
The problem is that in filling in the blanks in (3‟‟) there is simply not enough 
complexity in the original schema; not enough places for negation. The dominant 
commitment account solves the problem by introducing some complexity inside the 
scope of the dominant commitment operator, that is, by replacing the second „x‟ in 
(1‟) with „β!x‟. In effect, the commitment semantic account supposes that complexity 
can occur before the dominant attitude operator, so that „x is M‟ expresses „¬α!x‟ 
(where the external negation stands for rejection as distinct from Indifference or 
Agnosticism). But another place for complexity is within the relation between the 
utterance and attitude (the expression relation).  
To follow this suggestion, „expression‟ needs unpacking. One account is that 
expressing a mental state involves, as a necessary condition, advertising an intention 
to defend that state in open discussion, other things being equal.
31
 Suppose we 
substitute this into the original schema, which then becomes: 
 
(1‟‟) „x is M‟   advertises an intention to defend  α!x 
 
This provides obvious scope for the requisite complexity. The external negation 
schema would be: 
 
(3‟‟‟) „¬x is M‟  advertises an intention to attack  α!x 
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In the former case the agent advertises the intention to defend a particular way of 
responding to the world, the way encapsulated in the attitude „α!x‟. This defense will 
involve responding in that way oneself, but also the disposition to urge that mode of 
response upon others, by whatever argumentative means one considers appropriate. 
Agreement with the assertion will consist in coming to defend the same policy of 
response. In the latter case – the negation case – the agent advertises an intention to 
attack a particular way of responding to the world. This attack will involve not 
responding in that way oneself but also the disposition to urge people against that 
mode of response by whatever argumentative means one considers appropriate. 
Agreement with the assertion in this case will consist in coming to share the same 
propensity to attack.
32
  
On this view, the Hale/Unwin problem is solved. The externally negated 
sentence has distinct meaning from the internally negated sentence, which advertises 
an intention to defend α!¬x. External negation will also be distinct from Indifference, 
which involves no offensive or defensive intentions with respect to either attitude. 
The Agnostic does possess some discursive intentions but not the one‟s involved in 
negation. The Agnostic‟s „harrumphing‟ advertises an intention to attack, not the 
particular attitude expressed by an unnegated sentence, but any argument or 
consideration that could be offered in support of this attitude. In other words, what the 
Agnostic opposes is not the original unnegated sentence, but the assertion that any 
putative consideration provides reason to accept this sentence. The Agnostic does not 
possess an intention to attack the attitude expressed by the unnegated sentence, for to 
have this intention is to urge that the attitude encapsulates an inappropriate pattern of 
response to the world, and the Agnostic is precisely someone who denies that such 
judgments can be made. Thus the position of those who accept the negated sentence is 
distinct from Agnosticism.   
 
 Does this account of negation meet the three conditions? The Fregean 
Condition is met, although this is not a version of compositional semantics. Negation 
is not understood as involving a distinct functionally related attitude, but rather as 
involving a distinct semantic relation, related to yet distinct from the relation of 
expression. Despite shunning the Harean maneuver, however, the expression account 
can make some sense of the constancy of meaning. For the attitude expressed by „x is 
M‟ is clearly in view in both unnegated and negated contexts: there is an intention to 
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defend it in (1‟‟) and an intention to attack it in (3‟‟‟). This sameness of argumentative 
focus is a plausible explanans for the sameness of meaning across the contexts.   
The expression account meets the Semantic Condition because the intentions 
involved in the two contexts are inconsistent: one cannot consistently intend both to 
attack and defend an attitude. Because the sentences advertise inconsistent intentions, 
they are themselves inconsistent. This is another example of the A-type model of 
explaining inconsistency.
33
 Furthermore this inconsistency is obviously a result of the 
contribution of sentential negation to the negated sentence, for the function of the 
operator is precisely to switch the intention from a defensive to offensive mode 
(mirroring the reversal in truth-value that is the natural view of the role of negation), 
and it is this that generates the psychological inconsistency.  
Finally, the Generality Condition is met because the mental state which one is 
advertising an intention to defend or attack could be a belief, attitude or tree-tying 
commitment. In all cases, negation functions to reverse the direction of the intention 
towards the commitment. The nature of the commitment itself is unimportant.  
 
The Expression account meets the Fregean, Semantic and Generality 
conditions. Like the commitment semantics account, therefore, it deserves to be 
considered as a potentially viable expressivist account of negation.  
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5. Diagnosis of Schroeder’s Error 
  
 Besides generously elucidating the dominant commitment account and 
offering it to expressivists as a way to develop their views, Schroeder argues that it is 
the only possible way for expressivists to solve the negation problem. The existence 
of two viable alternatives proves this conclusion false. So where might Schroeder‟s 
argument go wrong?  
 Schroeder holds that an account of the semantics of negation needs to do at 
least two things. First, to solve the Unwin/Hale problem we need an account that has 
the requisite complexity. The problem, remember, is that the schema (1‟) is too simple 
– it has too few places for negation. To solve the problem we need more complexity 
in this schema (2008a, 589-591). Second, Schroeder claims, the resulting account 
must explain the inconsistency of sentences and their negations, for which A-type 
inconsistency is a good model (2008a, 579).  
 Schroeder‟s mistake is assuming that only place for complexity to occur is 
within the scope of a dominant commitment operator, thus preserving the A-type 
model in all cases. In fact, there are two further places for the complexity to occur: 
outside the dominant attitude operator (as in commitment semantics) and within the 
relation between the utterance and the attitude (as in the expression account). Both 
views preserve the A-type model, at least in some cases. Furthermore, where that 
model is given up, the resulting inconsistency is not, as Schroeder claims, necessarily 
mysterious (Schroder, 2008a, 581) for it can be explained in terms of the frustration of 
the function of the commitments in question (which is, in any case, one way of 
plugging the gap in the A-type model preferred by the dominant commitment 
account). Schroeder‟s mistake, therefore, is to misidentify the number of places where 
the requisite complexity may occur.  
It is worth remarking here on another advantage of the two alternatives to 
Schroeder‟s proffered dominant commitment account. Both commitment semantics 
and the expression account are not committed to any particular view of the nature of 
moral attitudes, whereas the dominant commitment account must hold that moral 
attitudes are ascended (thus having two places for negation within the dominant 
commitment). This can be considered an advantage for commitment semantics and 
the expression account, for two reasons. First, Schroeder‟s particular choice of the 
ascended attitude expressed by judgments of wrongness is „being for: blaming for‟, 
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but this seems to unfairly preclude the possibility of substantive moral positions 
according to which wrongdoing and blameworthiness come apart, such as Smart‟s 
extreme utilitarianism (1956, 347). Within the framework of the dominant 
commitment account, it is not clear that there is any better candidate for the attitude 
expressed by judgments of wrongdoing that doesn‟t have the unhappy result of ruling 
out substantively interesting moral positions by conceptual fiat. Second, the dominant 
commitment account of negation cannot apply to sentences taken to be expressive of 
non-ascended attitudes, for they do not have enough places for negation. Yet some of 
these sentences – aesthetic sentences, for example – can be intelligibly negated. These 
points provide additional reasons for expressivists to politely decline Schroeder‟s gift.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper is not to provide a „logic for the attitudes‟ that can 
explain all the logical relations between arbitrary sets of and moral and non-moral 
sentences.
34
 Rather it is just to show that there are expressivist accounts of negation 
that can explain its logical properties and that generalize. Such accounts are worthy of 
further consideration. Yet these accounts are not totally detached from the traditional 
understanding of logic with which the argument began. On one understanding at least, 
there is nothing more to a set of sentences being systematizable in truth-conditional 
terms than those sentences being able to function in the normal ways in logical 
contexts such as negation.
35
 On this view to show that sentences expressive of attitude 
can function in negation is to go part of the way of earning the right for those 
sentences to be systematized in truth-conditional terms. Understood this way, the 
expressivist accounts of negation offered here are not alternatives to the truth-
conditional understanding of negation with which we began, rather they are attempts 
to earn the right to the sort of systematization that talk of truth-conditions provides. If 
the coin is good, there is no attitudinal logic distinct from standard logic, just a 
deeper, perhaps surprising, route to the latter. The journey may be longer, but the 
destination reassuringly familiar.  
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1
 The two alternatives are distinct from those offered by Gibbard (2003) and Horgan and Timmons 
(2006). For problems with the former see Dreier (2006) and with the latter see Schroeder (2008a, 582-
4).   
2
 See e.g. Gibbard (1990, 2003) and Stevenson (1937). 
3
 Note that „simple‟ and „complex‟ as defined here are not exhaustive. Some sentences, such as 
questions and commands, are neither.  
4
 Though I don‟t have the space to elaborate here, these conditions generalise to other instances of the 
embedding problem.   
5
 For this point see Unwin (1999, 343) and Schroeder (2008a, 575). 
6
 As Unwin (1999, 352) recognises. 
7
 This suggestion is made by Unwin (1999, 349-52) and pursued at length by Schroeder (2008a, 
2008b). 
8
 See Blackburn (1998a, 8-14) and Gibbard (1990, chap. 3). 
9
 Initially, Schroeder (2008a, 577) seems to suggest that two contents are inconsistent just when they 
cannot both be true. The account offered here extends this idea to cover cases where contents do not 
have truth conditions, such as „blaming for murder‟.  
10
 See Hale (1993, 339) and Wright (1987, 33). 
11
 See Schroeder (2008a, 594). 
12
 See Schueler (1988). 
13
 See Schroeder (2008a, 591-2). 
14
 See Schroeder (2008a, 596-7). 
15
 See Schroeder (2008b, 14). I should add that I don‟t consider „geeky‟ to be derogatory; it seems to 
me to be synonymous with „rigorous‟ and „scholarly‟.  
16
 See Geach (1965). Searle (1962) gives a structurally similar argument in terms of speech acts: since 
there is no common speech act across the negated and unnegated contexts, a speech-act theory of 
meaning cannot preserve constancy of meaning across them.  
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17
 Diagnosis: Compositional semantics introduces is an isomorphism between the logical form of 
sentences and the psycho-functional form of the commitment they express. The dominant commitment 
account introduces an isomorphism between between the logical form of the sentences and the contents 
of the dominant commitment. The slide between the two is a subtle but important one in Schroeder (for 
the former see 2008a, 574, for the latter see 592-3).  
18
 Note that at this point a similar objection might apply to the case of non-moral sentences. Where F is 
a non-moral predicate, „x is F‟ expresses a belief that x is F, „¬(x is F)‟ expresses a belief that ¬(x is F), 
yet the latter is not a function of the former. This would seem to demonstrate that all expressivists face 
a Frege-Geach problem for their account of sentences expressive of belief, and even more worryingly, 
a problem which the Harean manoeuvre cannot avoid. However, the problem can be avoided so long as 
the belief that ¬(x is F) can be understood as some function of the belief that x is F. Commitment 
semantics, discussed below, secures this result.   
19
 It doesn‟t follow that the functional structure can always be identified independently of the logical 
articulation; see Blackburn (2002, 166-7). For developments of commitment semantics, see Blackburn 
(1988, 1998, 2002), Bjornsson (2001), Elstein (2007), Hale (1993) and Sinclair (2008).  
20
 See Blackburn (1988, 192 and 2002, 167). Bjornsson (2001, 88 & 94) talks of „negative opinions‟.  
21
 Formally, an attitude, α!x, can be represented as a policy function from stimulus S to reactions R, 
thus: Pol[R, S]. The rejection, or ¬α!x, can be represented as Pol[¬R, S], where „¬R‟ signifies some 
response other than R, thus „driving the negation inwards‟ (Blackburn, 1988, 192). The particular 
formalism chosen is less important than the philosophical understanding of the semantic relations that 
it formalises. Note that, in describing policies the brackets shouldn‟t be thought to signal ascent (this is 
what distinguishes the view from the dominant commitment account). The formalism doesn‟t signify a 
distinct higher-order policy directed at a reaction/stimulus pair; rather the policy is characterizable by 
this pair.  
22
 The exceptions are non-moral sentences that express attitudes. Perhaps aesthetic sentences are like 
this. The account of rejection in their case is identical to the account of rejection in the case of moral 
attitudes, since nothing in that account relied on a particular feature of the moral reaction.   
23
 See Schroeder (2008a, 587-2), Dreier (2006, 22) and Bjornsson (2001, note 7). 
24
 See Velleman (2000). 
25
 The inconsistency is more complex in the case of evaluative concepts, such as „good‟,  whose 
connection to practical guidance is less direct. But so long as the function of a moral concept is to 
provide practical guidance of some kind, inconsistent application of that concept will consist in 
recommending inconsistent courses of action. 
26
 Why might one form states that function this way? To keep track of the implications and consistency 
relations between more basic commitments. See Blackburn (1998, 71). 
27
 A weaker type of inconsistency is involved where the functions of the commitments are only 
contingently frustrated, such as when an agent desires outcomes that only happen to be mutually 
unrealizable. It is the goal of enquiry to uncover such inconsistencies.  
28
 Note how this account is consonant with Blackburn‟s account of illogicality as unintelligibility. See 
Blackburn (1998, 72 and 2002, 167).  
29
 This is a deficiency in the account of rejection given by Sinclair (2008, 267). 
30
 As Elstein (2007) realises.  
31
 See Blackburn (2001, 2006) and Barker (2006, 304-5). Note that Barker himself cannot accept the 
account of negation on offer here, since he holds that all expressive assertion advertises the intention to 
defend some commitment or other.  
32
 Note that commitment semanticists can accept the analysis of expression suggested by the expression 
account, but will reject the claim that negation involves a distinct kind of relation between utterances 
and commitments.  
33
 See Schroeder (2008a, 577).  
34
 See Blackburn (1988) for one such attempt. Both accounts of negation offered here are consistent 
with, but do not require, the formal model of consistency Blackburn offers in this paper. 
35
 I refer to various „minimalist‟ views of truth-aptness. See Wright (1992).  
